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1. Introduction
1
 
The most basic and fundamental need that human beings have is the need to be properly cared 
for. Already before their birth, human beings need proper care, for example by being provided 
with the right nutrition, not being exposed to toxics, and receiving the right professional care to 
check the health condition of the woman who carries the baby. Human beings who are just born 
are the most vulnerable of all human beings: they literally cannot survive more than a day if they 
do not receive the right kind of hands-on care: milk, warmth, comfort, protection and the tender 
love of caring adults.  
 Despite the fact that this surely has been an undisputed fact for a long time, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the question what this fact implies for political philosophy in general, 
and questions of social and distributive justice in particular – a field that has been very important 
among contemporary political philosophers, including in the work of Philippe Van Parijs. The 
question has been addressed in the literature on the ethics of care, but it is only more recently that 
these issues have been taken up in the philosophical analysis of justice (Okin 1989, Bubeck 1995, 
Kittay 1999, Engster 2007, Gheaus 2009). In some specific areas relatively more work has been 
done. For example, a few novel proposals have been made to use parental leave legislations as a 
vehicle to address issues of gender injustice, including one by Philippe Van Parijs himself (Van 
Parijs and Vielle 2001, Brighouse and Olin-Wright 2008, Gheaus and Robeyns 2011).  
 In this short essay I aim to contribute to the literature on care and justice by delving into 
another domain of public policy, namely the question of universal duties or citizen’s duties. I will 
start by arguing that any attempt at addressing care as an issue of justice is faced with a dilemma 
between the revaluation of care on the one hand, and the redistribution of care on the other. Care 
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work is undervalued both financially as well as in terms of the social status is commands, but it is 
also unequally distributed between men and women, with women doing the lion’s share of care 
work, which is arguably an issue of injustice. So from the perspective of justice we would need to 
both revalue as well as redistribute care work; however, revaluation is likely to lead to a 
deepening of the inequalities in the distribution of care work, whereas redistribution will not 
happen as long as care work is undervalued. We thus seem to be faced with a deadlock. Yet since 
I think the tension is practical and not fundamental, our task should be to use our imagination to 
find a solution to solve the dilemma. I will then argue that such a solution, albeit perhaps not a 
perfect solution, can be found by implementing a universal citizen’s duty to care.  
 
2. Characterising care 
Human beings are not born as capable, autonomous, individual adults who can provide and care 
for themselves. Rather, we are born as extremely vulnerable babies who are fully dependent on 
the care given to us by others. Following Bubeck (1995: ch. IV; 1999: 423), we can define care as 
the face-to-face activities that meet basic needs of those who cannot meet these needs themselves. 
These are “all those activities which make life livable for those not able to ‘fight for themselves’” 
(Bubeck 1999: 423).  
 Those ‘who cannot fight for themselves’ are not only the chronically vulnerable people, 
but all of us at some points in our lives. We cannot survive if we are not given dedicated, time-
intensive attention and hands-on care in the first years of our lives, and we continue to be 
dependent on care work by others throughout our lives, possibly becoming again heavily 
dependent on hands-on care at old age or in periods of illness and disability. Some human beings 
remain dependent on fulltime care throughout their lives, such as the severely disabled (Kittay 
1999). 
 Part of the hands-on care for dependents is done by care workers who perform care work 
as a profession: nannies, elderly carers, disability carers, babysitters, and so forth. In addition to 
the hands-on care that is done by care workers, the majority of care that dependents receive is 
unpaid work done by caregivers. These are generally relatives (parents or adult children), friends, 
neighbours and volunteers. It is often, whether exclusively or partly, a labour of love: it is 
something that caregivers primarily do out of love, sympathy and commitment for those who are 
dependent. But the fact that it has these other-regarding motives does not mean that it is not 
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‘work’: it has to be done by someone, and it requires time, energy, skills and dedication by the 
worker. Without being properly cared for, human beings risk being treated in an inhumane way, 
which could violate their dignity. In short, care is crucial for our survival, and for being able to 
live a dignified life.   
 
3. Why is care work an issue of justice?  
Despite the fact that care work has tended to be neglected by mainstream political philosophy, 
care is an important issue of social and distributive justice. Why is this the case?  
 First, care work is an issue of distributive justice because it is (a) work that needs to be 
done by someone, (b) it requires effort and dedication and thus represents significant 
(opportunity) costs, and (c) inevitably taps into ‘time’, which is a resource that is scarce in 
absolute terms. We know from time budget studies that people with significant care 
responsibilities experience a strong pressure on their time allocation, as care work competes with 
other types of work, especially paid work on the labour market. Put differently, people with care 
responsibilities for children, the elderly and the disabled, are very likely to be in a time-crunch if 
they are struggling to combine caring for dependents with holding a job (independent whether 
having a job is only motivated by the income it generates, or also by other aspirations, such as 
playing a role in public life or developing a professional identity). One of the consequences of 
informal care work are therefore its costs to the care worker, since it amounts to significant 
foregone earnings (Folbre 2008). Scarcity and issues of differential burdens and benefits are 
prime reasons to consider an issue to be an issue of distributive justice, and ‘care’ meets these 
conditions.  
 Second, in most cases care work is very poorly (if at all) rewarded. There are several 
explanations for this. One explanation is that those who need care generally have limited 
purchasing power; so the equilibrium price for care work will not be very high. Moreover, care 
work is very labour intensive, and hence there are few technological gains to be made that can 
drive down the costs of care work. In addition, care work is culturally coded ‘feminine’ work, 
and in patriarchal societies or societies with a patriarchal history, work culturally coded 
‘feminine’ tends to be undervalued. Finally, people who bear the largest burdens of care work 
tend to be poorly organized and weakly represented both politically as well as with respect to 
labour unions; hence no-one is really defending their interests at the political level. Most care 
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workers don’t have the time let alone the energy to do this: if anything, their most intense need is 
generally either more sleep, or else a little bit of time for themselves. 
 Third, while care work is generally considered very meaningful and important by care 
workers and in some cases also overall more enjoyable than alternative options, care work is not 
only characterised by a poor financial rewarding, but also generally comes with significant non-
financial burdens. People specializing in care work are likely to feel isolated, not able to develop 
all their skills and talents, often lack sufficient meaningful conversations with other adult human 
beings, have limited autonomy over their work and working conditions, and, for the less 
enjoyable forms of care, experience much higher levels of stress and risk of burn-out. Moreover, 
being out of the formal labour market for a while has been shown to have a life-long depressing 
effect on the earnings of care workers, increasing the risk of poverty after divorce or at retirement 
age.  
 Fourth, the burdens of care work are unevenly distributed in society. In particular, women 
do the vast majority of care work, especially unpaid care work. This is part of the gender division 
of labour, whereby men do much more of the paid market work, whereas women do much more 
of the unpaid household work and care work. The current social institutions in western societies 
only aggravate this situation, for example by discrimination in leave legislations after the baby is 
born, which discourages fathers from caring for their newborn, and more or less forces mothers to 
do so (Foubert 2002, Robeyns 2009). In addition, most jobs are still modelled around the 
assumption that the employee is free from care duties (whether care for infants, children, 
dependent elderly, or any other form of care). This, together with the less favourable conditions 
for part-time work compared to full-time work in most Western societies, provides more 
disincentives for couples to share paid work and unpaid care work genuinely equally compared 
with a (semi) traditional gender division of labour. Yet with a few exceptions, the vast majority 
of political philosophers who have analysed the gender division of labour have argued that it is 
unjust, and generally to the disadvantage of women. 
 One could wonder whether the pivotal reason why care is an issue of justice is really its 
unequal distribution. If it were the case that care is scare, that care work would be undervalued, 
and come with certain nonfinancial burdens – but at the same time the distribution of care work 
were equal, would there then still be an issue of justice here?  I would expect that in this situation 
the issues of injustice between care givers would be drastically reduced, perhaps even dissolve 
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completely – but that there would most likely be an undersupply of care work, which would harm 
those in need of care. If care work is undervalued, comes with significant nonfinancial burdens 
and will drastically tap into the scarce resource ‘time’, then it is likely that less care will be 
offered compared with a situation where care work would come with fewer burdens and would be 
higher valued. So even under a distribution of care work which would guarantee justice between 
care givers, there could still be an issue of justice between care recipients – the dependent 
children, frail elderly, disabled and ill. Yet clearly the main case for arguing that there is an 
injustice between care givers comes from the conjunction of the first three reasons with the issue 
of the unequal distribution of care work.  
 Note also that the above four reasons are by no means meant to be exhaustive. While there 
may be more reasons then the ones mentioned here, the above four reasons provide, in my view, 
sufficient ground to consider care to be an issue of justice.  
 
4. A dilemma and a proposal 
If the analysis sketched in the previous sections is correct, then we are facing a dilemma. On the 
one hand, given the importance of care for those cared for and also for a humane and just society, 
we should try to revaluate care: either by paying those who care a decent wage, or else by 
providing them e.g. with extra pension credits or other state-guaranteed benefits.  On the other 
hand, assuming (as I do) that men and women should have the same genuine freedom to choose 
the kind of lifestyle they want, and thus not be given differential opportunities by gendered social 
institutions (such as the discriminatory maternity leave regulations) or have their preferences 
being moulded by a gendered culture, we don’t want to reinforce the traditional gender division 
of labour. The tension we are then facing, is that revaluing care will strengthen the gender 
division of labour: so those actions that would contribute to the move towards justice for carers 
and those cared for, are harmful from the perspective of gender justice, and vice versa. If we 
revalue care by rewarding it more and making sure the social protection of carers are stronger, 
more women will not resist the societal pressure on them to perform care work, and hence the 
gendered division of labour will be reinforced; yet if we do not revalue care, then (as is currently 
happening) more women have an additional incentive to resist gendered norms and expectations, 
and the gender division of labour becomes on average more equal, but at the cost of justice for 
carers and the people they care for.  Is there a way out of this dilemma? 
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 I believe there is at least something that can contribute to solving this dilemma, even if it 
will not be sufficient by itself, and that may also be beneficial for other social goods: the 
implementation of a citizen’s duty to care. Under this proposal, all citizens should, upon reaching 
a certain age (say, the age of advanced adolescence or adulthood), spend some time caring for 
those who are in need of care: either small children, the disabled, vulnerable elderly, or the ill.  
By imposing this as a moral and political duty on all citizens, one would make sure that all adults 
have had, at the start of their adult life, a significant experience of actually performing care work. 
The duty should be universal – that is, it should be carried out by all members of society, except 
if some strong reasons make those members unsuited (on this more below). 
 Implementing a universal duty to care would be morally recommendable for many 
reasons. The first reason is the epistemic virtue of the fact that it is a universal duty: it would give 
all a lived-through experience of caring, which would weaken the problem of misrecognition of 
care work. People who have been primary care workers are much more likely to understand how 
demanding and burdensome (some forms of) care can be; and they do not think lightly of it, 
equating it to ‘leisure’, as most economic models do. They also know what skills are needed to do 
that work; and are more likely to understand what the costs are to those who are long-term care 
givers. Thus, by putting all citizens in a situation in which they learn to care, they will better 
appreciate what care work really entails, which would make them less casual about assuming that 
those who do the work have an easy time, or that this is work that should not be decently 
rewarded, since it would amount to merely a hobby or unskilled labour. One important 
consequence of this epistemic virtue is that if all men and women have an experience of care 
work before embarking on parenthood, they will make a better informed decision on how to 
divide up the paid work and care work in their families. There is evidence that fathers who took 
more leave after birth are more involved in care work throughout the childhood of their children, 
and are less likely to unthinkingly assume that a (mild) traditional gender division of labour is 
how they should organize family life.  
 Secondly, the universal duty to care would turn care work into a public issue, and thereby 
hopefully increasing the percentage of couples who openly discuss the way they want to organize 
the division of labour within their family, but also more openly with friends and others; a 
surprisingly large number of couples do not discuss these issues at all, thus giving all power to 
habits and traditions. This could entail an important step towards more gender just societies. 
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 Third, a large supply of care workers would meet the growing need for care work which is 
due to the aging of western societies (and, possibly, the weaker social fabric which provided 
easier access to more hands-on care).  Professional care workers increasingly argue that they are 
working under such time pressure, that they can only perform the most urgent of care duties; that 
there is very little time left for emotional care work, or time to simply listen and accompany 
dependent people. If a citizens’ duty to care were implemented, many ears would become 
available to listen to the elderly, many feet to walk and play with children, many hands to push 
wheelchairs or make a cup of tea. In other words, a citizen’s duty to care would increase the net 
supply of care-givers.  
 Finally, even if the epistemic virtue and the increased supply would not have the effects 
one would hope for, the implementation of a citizens’ duty to care will have some redistributive 
effects, making more men do hands-on care compared to the current situation.  
  
5. Concluding remark 
Obviously, there are further modifications needed to this proposal to make it implementable. One 
qualification is to address the question what to do with those citizens who are unable to perform 
their citizen’s duty to care. Those who are somehow impaired in their abilities which are needed 
to care (such as the mentally disabled), should be freed from their citizen’s duty to care. Those 
who are already engaging or have engaged in a significant duty to care, should perhaps also be 
exempted, or else their previous/current care work needs to be taken into account when 
redefining their citizen’s care duty.  Finally, those who believe that they are unsuited to care, for 
example because they don’t have the right dispositions (e.g. they have a dominant, aggressive 
character), should be given an opportunity to learn how to care. Our societies offers courses in all 
sorts of skills, attitudes, and competencies, so that it should surely be possible to offer courses in 
which one develops one’s skills to care. If, however, a person would still fail such a training 
course, then he or she can perform an alternative for the citizen’s duty to care, for example, by 
caring for abused animals or caring for a forest.  
 Ultimately, the hope is that just as for decades the default has been that there are all sorts 
of duties that we owe to our fellow citizens, such as paying taxes if we are able to, the default 
should become that each citizen should spend some time caring for those who are not able to fend 
for themselves. We may, perhaps, be positively surprised to see how it would make our societies 
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not only more just, but also more humane. 
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